Persia and the Malay World: Commercial and Intellectual Exchanges
Claude Guillot

Islam and H. G. Nahuys' Memoirs on the Java War 1825-1830
Achmad Syahid

DAR AL-ARDWA AL-SHAMADA
Muhammadiyah’s Position and Thoughts on NÉGARA PANCASILA
Hasnan Bachtiar

Ika Yunita Fauzia, Abdul Kadir Riyadi
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Abstract: This article analyzes the worldview of the memoir of H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, Resident of Surakarta, entitled Verzameling van officiele Rapporten, betreffende den Oorlog op Java in de Jarren 1825-1830, as a polemic with H.J.J.L. Ridder de Stuer. His memoirs represent a typical Dutch government worldview based more on colonial interests and power tendencies. The colonial interests made colonial government have a tendency and take a certain position from the start against Islam and the cultural and Islamic characterist resistance movements launched by Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo. The descriptive analysis of the memoirs about the Javanese War which is presented chronologically makes it easy for us to reveal how war figures put Islam as the motivation for war, the spirit, the basis for thinking, the strengthening of the support network, the basis for regulation, and the justification for starting or ending the war. Meanwhile, the colonial government saw Islam as being used as a foster for the character’s socio-vertical mobility ambitions, as an identity, propaganda material, and procedures in oath-taking ceremonies.

Keywords: Islam, Javanese War, Diponegoro, Kiai Modjo, Pangeran-Priyayi, Kiai-Santri.

Kata kunci: Islam, Perang Jawa, Diponegoro, Kiai Modjo, Pangeran-Priyayi, Kiai-Santri.

ملخص: تحليل هذه المقالة رؤية العالم عند ح. غ. ناهويس فان بورغست المقيم في سوراكارتا، من خلال مذكراته الأربعة أعداد بعنوان: مجموعة من التقارير الرسمية عن الحرب على جاوا في 1825-1830، باعتبارها جدلا بينه وبين ح. ج. ج. ل. ريدير دي ستير. تتمثل مذكراته رؤية علم نموذجية للحكومة الهولندية تستند بشكل أكبر إلى المبادئ السلطوية والصالح الاستعمارى. هذه المصادر الاستعمارية جعلت تحليل موازٍ لوبين منذ البداية ضد الإسلام وحركات المقاومة الثقافية والإسلامية التي أطلقها ديبونيجورو وكياهي مودجو. إن التحليل الوصفي مذكرات حرب جاوا التي تم تقديمها بترتيب زمني يكشف بسهولة عن كيفية قيام فادة الحرب بوضع الإسلام داعما للحرب وروحه وأساسا التفكير وعامل نفوذ شبكات الدعم وأساس النظام وميدانات إطلاق الحرب أو إلحاحها. بينما رأت الحكومة الاستعمارية أن الإسلام تم استخدامه حافزا لطموحات الحراك الاجتماعي-الرئيسي للقلق مهاجمة وما وعى دعائية وإجراءات مراقبة أداء اليمين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الإسلام، حرب جاوا، ديبونيجورو، كياهي مودجو، الأمير، كياهي-سانتري.
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1858) is the Dutch Resident both of Surakarta and of Yogyakarta (1818-1822) then the Resident of Surakarta (1827-1830). Five years after his retirement he published a four-volumes memoir on the Java War, entitled *Verzameling van officiele Rapporten, betreffende den Oorlog op Java in de Jaren 1825-1830* (1835a, 1835b, 1836a, 1836b). The source of his memoir writing comes from the Surakarta archives, that according to *Guide to the Source of Asian History* (1989), in the period 1646-1890 the quantity reached 701 volumes of 24 linear meters. The memoir is the answer to his polemic with H. J. J. L. Ridder de Stuer, who wrote *Memoires sur la guerre de Java*. De Stuers, among other things, wrote that the origins of the Java War were sparked *Coup d’Oeil sur l’île de Java* at the events of the Giyanti Treaty on February 13, 1755 (Mandoyokusumo 1980, 5). Nahuys refuted de Stuer argument by writing a memoir based on complete official documents, even though there were misquotations of the statement, of the data accuracy, of the spelling of names, of the place names and of the sentence marks in it (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, i–viii, 1–10). Moreover, in 1822 Nahuys sailed back to the Netherlands and only returned in August 1827 to serve as a Resident of Surakarta. Like de Stuer, Nahuys was also an intellectual Dutch bureaucrat. He mastered the Malay language (Amran 1997, 16) which made it easier for him to write about several places in western part of Nusantara and Singapore in the 19th century, as well as his involvement in the Padri War. He also wrote a reflection on the Dutch East Indies in terms of socio-religious life (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1827, 1958).

Nahuys’ memoir seems lacks the sincerity of colonial officials to truly understand to the moral dimensions of Diponegoro’s struggle and Kiai Modjo’s religious narrative. Typically, the memoir represents the official point of view of the Dutch which combines legal, political and militaristic approaches. As *de jure*, the Dutch ruled over the Surakarta Sunanate and the Yogyakarta Sultanate based on the Giyanti Treaty (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 8–10; Ricklefs 1974b). Ignoring the sensitive point in history that the treaty tragically ended Mataram as an independent Javanese kingdom. Did not consider it important to feel any objections to Dutch interference with the internal palace of Surakarta and of Yogyakarta, which were no longer powerless (Maddison 1989, 645–70).
The Dutch were in fact aware that their policies which emphasized security, order and peace needed broad and strong support from the alliance. In order to earn the hearts of the Javanese, the Dutch imaged themselves as the party who respected the sultan as the heir to the Javanese ancestors, living with the Javanese in peace and harmony, for the sake of attaining prosperity. While Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo were labelled a rebels against legitimate authority and were against all these Dutch efforts. Realizing the fact that Islam was very influential in the archipelago, the Dutch launched modernization even though they kept their distance from Islam (Ali 2016, 35–296).

As if speaking to his own public, in the introduction to the memoirs (1835a), December 5, 1835, Nahuys wrote that the Java War was an important history of Dutch wealth, the use of armed force against rebels, cost a lot and resulted in thousands of lives. Memoair also emphasizes the positives of war such as opportunities to develop great talents, religious history, lessons on wisdom for the precious future of the Paradise Islands in the East and a touchstone for collaborative efforts to prosper the Javanese (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, v–viii). In the view of the public in the Netherlands itself, expansionism through colonialism triggered adrenaline, warded off pessimism and at the same time strengthened a sense of nationalism. His mind is possessed with a feeling of superiority (Coté 1995, 253–77). Nusantara was considered a vassal, a colony subject to the Dutch central government. Driven more by salient economic interests, the natives are generally considered to be subjects, occupying the lowest caste, after Dutch, Arab and Chinese, not citizens whose rights are respected (Suminto 1985). There are many things that are psychologically, anthropologically and historically neglected in the decision-making process in this kind of caste society (Kommers and Buskens 2007, 352–69) which, until recently, have not been dealt with properly. Therefore, in a newly published comprehensive history of anthropology in the Netherlands, several studies focused on the character, rather than on the substance of colonial anthropology. In the case of Dutch colonial representations of Indonesia, ‘colonial anthropology’ appears to be an assemblage of various disciplines that constituted a fragmented whole (Indologie; Dutch Indies Studies. This typical Dutch official perspective is one of the shaping characters of Indonesian Islam in the future (Laffan 2013).
The Java War was the struggle of the main figures of the people, the prince-priyayi-the ulama and the santri. Diponegoro himself represented a priyayi cum the santri because since his childhood he had engaged with the community and the scientific world of the santri. As a prince, there were some syncretic followers who believed that he was a manifestation of the just king as predicted by Jayabaya (1135-1157) and Ronggowarsito (1802-1875) (Carey 1986, 59–137): two legendary Javanese poet whose predictions are considered have a magical power (Kamadjaja 1964, 89–90; Simuh 1995, 185). Diponegoro took to the battlefield as a “power of prophecy” (Carey 2008, 1–68) in the realm of factual history. The close kinship, sociological and psychological relationship with Diponegoro, Sentot son of Prawirodirjo who inherited blood as “rebels” (Soekanto 1959) also joined the war. Kiai Modjo, who was born from a family of ulama whose students were scattered in Solo and Yogyakarta, including in the both palace, appeared as an orthodox figure, he complements the war with a religious narrative. Documents confiscated by the Dutch from the post of the Diponegoro paramilitary forces, Kiai Modjo, are said to be the figure behind war justification based on Islamic narrative.

The combination of the priyayi Diponegoro, the young Sentot, and the Kiai Modjo as the par excellence ulama making war gaining widespread and entrenched support (Carey 2008, 440). In this war, the Dutch received the support of native rulers in Java, Madura, Ambon, Tidore, Buton and Minahasa. The natives who sided with the Dutch were cynically known as Londo ireng (the Dutch are black). The involvement of the Londo ireng, most of whom were Muslims, developed a point of view that the Java War is a civil war.

Kiai Modjo’s war motivation was to uphold Islamic teachings and dignity. War is the only way because of Diponegoro at the initial meeting with him conveyed various crucial problems so that it seemed that all these problems could be resolved by performing pure Islamic shari'ah (van der Kroef 1949, 430–33). They seem to crave orthodoxy Islam which is typically different from court Islam which tends to be heterodoxy (Ricklefs 2006). Another crucial issue that Diponegoro complained about was the Dutch trade monopoly; interfere in determining the succession of the sultan as religious administrators where it is considered that they violate court etiquette (Dumadi 1986, 43); rampant sexual relations as temporary concubines (Andaya 1998,
including Diponegoro’s sibling, so he was rejected when he was about to return to Tegal Rejo (Carey 1981, 256); natives women who generally came from local indigenous figures were used as a power transaction tool between the Dutch and the court elite; and Prince Mangkubumi’s sister’s affair scandal with the patih Danurejo the IV (1813-1847). Not long after the meeting, Kiai Modjo married Raden Ajeng Mangkubumi, the divorcee of Prince Mangkubumi, Diponegoro’s uncle. It seems that this marriage strengthens the emotional connection as well as strengthens the kinship alliance between them.

These indigenous women who were sexually exploited increased in intensity since the era of Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert, when he was the Resident of Yogyakarta (1823-1825) and P. F. H. Chevallier served as Assistant-Resident of Yogyakarta (1823-1825) (Houben 1994, 199–200). Both are said to often bring palace women to accompany them on trips or as offerings (Carey 2010, 12–15). Even Chevallier was outraged when he was reminded: “I will do whatever I want”, while his hand hit Diponegoro’s head. Ghazali, a senior leader who later joined the Diponegoro war, said Chevallier’s actions were a cause for concern (Carey 2008, 550–51). When those who stood on Diponegoro’s side surrendered, both of them often took away their wives or daughters (Hogendorp 1913, 40). Both Diponegoro and Mangkubumi could not do much, even when they were both guardians of the sultan (Carey 1976, 52–78). Morally stand on Diponegoro’ side, Mangkubumi finally joined the war (Creese 2015). The phenomenon of taking indigenous women as concubines was considered normal and the use of this sexuality relationship continued to flourish until after the Java War. Frans Gerhardus Valck, the Resident of Yogyakarta (1831-1841), is said to have forced his former concubine to become one of the official wives of Sultan Hamengkubuwono V (Houben 1994, 9).

Islam in the Java War

The memoir (1825a), mentions Islam three times, which presents the views of Islam Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo which he used to build perceptions of the colonial government and their position in the Java War (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 160, 242–43). Memoirs volume II (1835b) mentions Islam three times, volume III (1836a) mentions Islam enam times, while volume IV (1836b) mention Islam once. The whole put Islam in the context as a source and reference of values in
deciding their choice of struggle. The interpretation and intensity of their relation to Islam affect their attitudes, perceptions, positions and roles during the war. Kartodirdjo (Kartodirdjo 1977), Carey and other scholars have explored the history of the Java War (Carey 1985, 2008, 509–601; Scalliet 1990, 512–14). In the memoir, Nahuys did not realize that Diponegoro was upset when he was appointed as the guardian of Sultan Hamengkubuwono the V along with Mangkubumi, Ratu Ageng and Ratu Kencono (van der Kroef 1949, 428–29). Ratu Ageng and Ratu Kencono take care of and for the sultan, while Diponegoro and Mangkubumi are in charge of palace management and leadership.

Nahuys flared up at De Stuers’ mention “on August 3, 1825, Raden Mas Alip, one of the sons of Diponegoro testified to De Kock that his father had long been angry with the Dutch and was disappointed with the sultan’s attitude of refusing his advice to be sovereign, not supporting himself and his officials relying on Dutch subsidies. Mas Alip also conveyed that Diponegoro did not believe Ratu Ageng’s letter advising that Chevallier, van den Berg and Bouwens would not deceive him. Diponegoro spent the night discussing with his trusted people, Demang Pajang, Buro Resso, Arab ulama Shaykh Achmat, his son-in-law Achmat, Prince Mudo Wiriodikromo and Djio Mohammad” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 10–14).

The relationship with Sultan Hamengkubuwono the IV was suitable, Nahuys did not think that Diponegoro would be disappointed. Nahuys is upset why he doesn’t talk to him so that it can be resolved like a disagreement with Prince Panular and Prince Blitar? For Nahuys, Diponegoro was the same as Raden Mas Said or Prince Adipati Mangkunegoro who fought Surakarta, Yogyakarta and the Dutch in 1743-1758; he was disappointed with the Sultan and hated the Europeans, because the interests and honor demanded were not fulfilled. If Diponegoro succeeds like Pakubuwono the II, then all the people and Europeans will respect him (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 14–18, 82).

By going to the caves to meditate in addition to finding a location as a war base, Nahuys said Diponegoro had indeed planned a rebellion from the beginning. Diponegoro is a problematic figure who misleads the Javanese, believing in superstition as a source of motivation by going to shamans, chanting spells and receiving war *wangsit* (vision) from Nyai Roro Kidul. He was also foolish, believing in spirits by
mediating under a jackfruit tree, like his uncle, Prince Diposono, who in 1822 led to the killing of Europeans, Chinese and the instability of the palace. Because he was evil-minded, his vast influence and mass-based support networks were exploited for criminal activity that killed tens of thousands of people (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 36–38, 64–65).

Nahuys’ memoir (1836a) begins with the Batavia report, 17 November 1828, regarding the results of the negotiations between Raden Adipati Wironegoro who represented the Dutch and Kiai Modjo, on 31 October 1828. This negotiation took place within 1½ paal east of the village of Mlangi. This follow-up meeting was held, because the first negotiations in Pajang did not produce results. At this second meeting, Wironegoro was escorted by a 3rd car barigade led by J. E. Le Bron De Wexela, while Kiai Modjo was accompanied by kiai and imam’s with 2,500-3,000 supporters (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 363).

Kiai Modjo and Wironegoro reportedly appreciated the negotiations; they came in complete formation. As a ulama, Kiai Modjo started the dialogue by speaking about faith and Islam that every Muslim holds. Wironegoro expressed his objection, because the negotiation forum was not the place to discuss faith and Islam because it was not relevant in the context of ending war. Wironegoro asked Kiai Modjo to confirm whether he was sent officially under the authority of Diponegoro. Kiai Modjo replied affirmatively: "My God empowered me to talk about faith and Islam and used them as a basis for starting or ending wars" (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 363–64).

When Kiai Modjo spoke about faith and Islam as the basis of war, Wironegoro responded: "I came here not to discuss faith and Islam, but to find out what the intentions of Kiai Modjo and His Majesty Diponegoro are to restore harmony and peace". Kiai Modjo then answered: "I have the privilege of speaking about the both on behalf of His Majesty Diponegoro, His Majesty the Sultan of Yogyakarta and His Majesty of the Sunan of Surakarta. Also to the Dutch commander. I invite you, my child, to have a friendly dialogue, based on our religion. I could think of nothing else, until this issue of faith and Islam was completely agreed. Now I ask you to tell me when I can meet His Highness the Great and the ulama”. Report appreciates Wironegoro’s articulation during the negotiations, although it seems that Wironegoro
does not want to appreciate the religious language of Kiai Modjo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 364). The negotiations did not reach an agreement, except for arranging a further negotiation at the same place, at Wednesday, November 5, 1828.

Hearing the report, H. M. De Kock, left for Yogyakarta from Magelang to coordinate with Nahuys, Yogyakarta Resident and the Yogyakarta Court Commissioner to discuss further preparations. Since the ceasefire had no effect on the situation on the ground, De Kock ordered every level of military commanders to be on war alert. The main policy for the negotiations was outlined by De Kock himself and his military commanders, to be discussed with Nahuys and the Resident of Yogyakarta. The results were used as guidance in further negotiations. On the morning of November 5, Nahuys, van Nes as the Resident of Yogyakarta, the panghulu and representatives of the Surakarta and of Yogyakarta palace headed to Mlangi, escorted by the 3rd mobile brigade and the Wironegoro soldiers. Kiai Modjo was accompanied by 25-30 kiai who were also leaders of his paramilitary forces. Kiai Modjo welcomed the delegation as usual for the other guests. Nahuys stated that they took the initiative to invite Kiai Modjo to negotiate to end the war and stop a serious disaster after three years of war. Speaking in Javanese, Wironegoro very clearly hopes that Kiai Modjo and his supporters will have the same spirit, while submitting documents containing the aims and objectives of offering a peaceful path through negotiations (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 364–65).

During the negotiations it had actually appeared that Kiai Modjo’s attitude was lenient, as long as the government promised protection against the spirit of Islam. The talks agreed to a five-day truce. During the ceasefire Kiai Modjo conveyed the results of the negotiations to his followers in Kanogoro, Melati, Pisangan and Tegal Waru, while waiting for Diponegoro’s response (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 365). Both De Kock and Nahuys are in Yogyakarta waiting for answers. On the evening of November 9, 1828, Wironegoro received Diponegoro’s letter through a Kiai Modjo envoy, which is Diponegoro emphasized that he did not want to rush to talk about peace, before seeing evidence that the Dutch respected Javanese symbols of power, appreciated Islam in line with its efforts to build prosperity. If the Dutch displayed such evidences, from then on, the war ended by itself (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 365–66). In his reply, Wironegoro said that serving
Yogyakarta and Surakarta meant that the government respected Islam as well as those of Javanese culture. If the government discussed with Kiai Modjo and Diponegoro, it was solely for the sake of ending the war. The government is only carrying out its usual duties, in order to restore peace and public order (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 366).

**Islam, Colonialism and the Java War**

The Batavia report dated August 2, 1825 states that Diponegoro - one of the guardians of the Sultan of Yogyakarta who ascended to the throne at the age of 2 years - since July 21, 1825 has rebelled. Its headquarters in Selarong is 7 paal from Yogyakarta. Although not moved by the same hostility towards the Dutch (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 75), Mangkubumi and most of the princes and their extended families joined the war. The Resident of Yogyakarta asked for clarification, but Diponegoro never obeyed. Batavia responded to this as “an unpleasant incident because the peace was disturbed” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 1–4).

The memoir does not reveal the reasons why Diponegoro rebelled. The Dutch feel that they have been fine, and have not had any complaints from Diponegoro. His life is described as pursuing religion, trying to be an example in this field. There is no information that this resistance was Diponegoro’s way of demanding a position in the Yogyakarta Palace. The report on August 6, 1825 stated that on July 30, 1825 De Kock arrived at the Surakarta Sunanate to meet Sunan and the royal elites. Sunan was committed to helping the Dutch, especially supplying food ingredients. The Palace of Surakarta and of Yogyakarta must be cleansed of rebellious elements. Outside the palace, the main roads from Surakarta to Yogyakarta was riddled with sporadic attacks that could easily lead to riots (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 4–5).

The report also contained the text of the proclamation that De Kock announced in Surakarta Adiningrat palace on August 5, 1825. The text of the proclamation was consulted in advance to the Sunan of Surakarta, the Sultan of Yogyakarta and their royal elites, which was based on a Dutch agreement with both of them which was based on goodwill and a passion for mutual loyalty. The proclamation said Diponegoro and Mangkubumi had left the capital city of Yogyakarta, provoking the population to rob, loot and take up arms (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 6). The Dutch wants nothing but restoring safety with full
responsibility, maintaining order and order for the princes and their people. The text of the proclamation emphasized: First, the Governor General with the support of the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta will restore complete peace. Second, the regent and officials under the obligation to obey and carry out orders, including those of indigenous officials, both from Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Third, appeal to all princes and people who follow Diponegoro, to return to their homes immediately if they wish to obtain forgiveness. All people are asked to be vigilant and maintain peace. Fourth, those who rebel and disturb the security of order will be subject to severe penalties. Fifth, all these notifications will be sent to all regents and officials below to be known and implemented (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 6–7).

On July 27, 1825, the first military contact between the Dutch and Diponegoro broke out. De Kock in Batavia was fully empowered to take action to resolve the situation and prevent further consequences. He immediately went to Semarang, then to Surakarta. One Weltevrede detachment in Semarang was deployed to Yogyakarta. Arriving in Yogyakarta, they joined with the Surakarta and the Yogyakarta palaces forces led by Prince Mangkunegoro. In the midst of this tense atmosphere, Ratu Ageng and the young sultan were inside the Yogyakarta palace. Both are reportedly in very good relations with the Resident of Yogyakarta, A. M. Theodorus de Salis. Prince Pakualam and the Yogyakarta Palace officials were upset. The residency of Kedu was surrounded by Diponegoro’s paramilitary forces, they were also reported to have repeatedly attacked Magelang.

In July – December 1825 there was an increase in the intensity and escalation of the war. The report on August 7, 1825, from Surakarta stated that the Governor General was still based in Surakarta. On July 28, 1825, Cochius was assigned to lead a detachment with 400 soldiers to crush Diponegoro in Selarong. Raden Mas Soewongso from the legion of Mangkunegoro soldiers joined in. They managed to fend off Diponegoro’s general attack on August 11, 1825 in the capital city of Yogyakarta and captured Prince Paku Alam. In that same month, Pietersen, Commander of the Expeditionary Unit of the Dutch Sea Fleet in Sulawesi, sent several frigates and karvets to carry soldiers to Java arriving at the end of August 1825 (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 9). Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Magelang, Kedu and Minoreh-Bandongan are gripping, military patrols in Klaten are often disturbed and the regional
districts above Pekalongan are controlled by Diponegoro paramilitary forces. On August 22, 1825, there was an attack in Yogyakarta which caused casualties on both sides. The demang in the Djabarankas and Karangkobar districts in the Pekalongan Residency persuaded the leader of Diponegoro paramilitary forces to surrender, but they refused. Prince Serang, who sided with Diponegoro, took control of Semarang and Demak, occupied the bridge at Barui to control the Solo Gagaban route, the Assistant Resident of Salatiga and threatened Ampel's position (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 9).

On August 28, 1825, Suryadiningrat - the son-in-law of the Sultan of Sumenep who was also the oldest son of Paku Alam of Surakarta - arrived in Samarang with 1,500 soldiers who were carried by 46 ships. They were positioned in the Kedu Residency (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 17). Grobogan and the residency of Jepara fell after being attacked by more than tens of thousands of Diponegoro paramilitary troops. The Jayang Sekar cavalry were seized and the bridge was burned to prevent the Dutch military from moving. The Diponegoro paramilitary troops also controlled the area between Dongo and Demak, Jepara and Purwodadi. Van Geen from Makassar arrived in Sidoarjo on 30 August with 350 soldiers from the Surabaya garrison, 2,200 Madurese and 400 Makassar soldiers trained to European standards. On September 8, 1825 as many as 350 Dutch soldiers, 2,000 Madurese and 1,600 soldiers of Sultan H. Panumbahan of Sumenep who had just returned from an expedition to Sulawesi arrived in Samarang. At the end of October, the number of Madurese soldiers from Sumenep and Pamekasan, led by two princes, Suryadiningrat and Sidjodiningrat, increased dramatically. Pamekasan soldiers led by Tjokrodiningrat reduced the confrontation of the Kediri Regent, Kertodirdjo. By December 1825, Dutch military posts had been established along the main inter-city roads, so that the Diponegoro paramilitary troops were moving through unfamiliar routes in villages, inland and mountains. In March 1826 the Dutch military forces, equipped with modern weapons, was concentrated throughout the war zone. Among other things, it was used when 500 santri soldiers were attacked in Tempel on February 18, 1826, as well as in other war areas, which killed thousands of Diponegoro paramilitary forces; included Tumenggung Alap-Alap, Demang Tertomengolo, Demang Tertojoedo and Sodrono were killed in the battles in Krapyak and Bantul where Koelman fought paramilitary forces led by Tumenggung Nitikromo.
The Sultan of Sumenep, who was escorted by 400 soldiers, ordered daily from Semarang to facilitate coordination with the Governor General (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 124, 127).

Wiroyudo, an influential prince in Kedu and 4 of his subordinates surrendered in March 1826. Also the Diponegoro paramilitary forces concentrated in Pulo Watu and Katjuan villages led by two of his sons and several princes (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 129). The Dutch used it as propaganda, that more and more natives longed for peace, while continuing to hold negotiations so that Diponegoro’s paramilitary forces would surrender. In April Mangkunegoro headed to Klaten to face the Diponegoro paramilitary forces led by Tumenggung Sumeroredjo who was supported by 70 village heads. This month it was reported that Van Geen injured his thigh while leading a military expedition to the main of Diponegoro paramilitary troops post in Pleret Palace, 7 paal distance from Yogyakarta. The palace was built by Sultan Agung (ruled 1613-1645) in 1615 with walls 20 feet high. Van Gen is fully supported by modern armed forces attacked the palace from the direction of Pasar Gede, about 1 paal from Pleret palace and 4 paal from Imogiri (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 145–1453). The Dutch intermediate officers and Madurese soldiers led by Ariosurio participated in the expedition. As soon as Van Geen approached the palace within 400 feet, armed men were seen in various positions. The battle lasted for 3 hours, starting at 5 am on June 11, 1826, even though Van Geen could have took the Pleret Palace in less than 30 minutes. The fire of howitzer and tweeponders cannon resulted in the defense of Diponegoro’s paramilitary forces in the palace in chaos and then fled through the river behind (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 145–1453). After the palace was taken over, a stable full of cows and 30 horse saddles was found, the decorations showing the owners as village heads. Since 10 am, Van Geen has been in the Pleret Palace for several hours. He gave orders to Kriegenberg to quell the imam attack on a mosque in Wonokromo, before moving on to Imogiri (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 134–35).

In other areas, in May 1826, the Dutch military expedition in Probolinggo, Kedu, Magelang, Minoreh and Kendal caused losses to Diponegoro, although it did not demoralize them. The regents of Jepara and Tuban were confronted by 2,000 Diponegoro paramilitary forces who were mobilized by demang (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 154–55). In August 1826, 70 war volunteers from Surabaya, Gresik,
Sumenep, Bangkalan and Besuki arrived at the Dutch army post in Yogyakarta. The commander of the 3rd Military Division, Bonnelie, trained them, before deploying them to enemy colonies. Soon after, they again sent 20 trained volunteers from Surabaya. Batavia sent Resler, Canter Viscccher, Akkerman and DeBruin to Yogyakarta to take care of these volunteers (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 162–63). In June 1827, Prince Nottoprodjo and Serang and their respective wives, also Tumenggung and 200 of his mens surrendered (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 385–87, 387–90). From Tumenggung and Diponegoro’s son-in-law, information was obtained that people everywhere were tired of war. The Dutch report said this information could weaken the morale of Diponegoro’s struggle, but until September 1827 open attacks were still ongoing.

On behalf of the King of the Netherlands, Leonard Du Bus De Gisignies issue the government’s appeal to all Javanese peoples: “The war has been going on for more than two years. Many areas that were previously beautiful were damaged by war. Sad and miserable. We continued the war because we loved the Javanese, not more because we wanted to live with the Javanese, like our ancestors who lived in peace and comfort. But most of the Javanese were influenced by the rebellious kiai and princes, taking up arms against the legitimate princes and masters. They consider this a matter of religion, but it is not. Unfortunately as a result, they leave their homes and families, go from one place to another, move to foreign places, stay away from livelihoods, survive by plundering, their homes and fields were destroyed, life was miserable or ended in death. Citizens who obey the authority of the law live in peace and quiet, enjoy domestic life, receive legal protection and security from our officers and fighters, are given the freedom to practice religious teachings, cultivate crops in the fields regularly and live prosperously. It is not difficult for us, our own strength, especially with the help of the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, of Madura and of Sumenep, to crush and punish the rebels. But we saved them, we loved the Javanese, most of whom were deceived by their leaders. We tied to the land where their ancestors lived. Even though we have enough military power to destroy them, also against Kiae Modjo who now claims to be the leader, we still open the door to peace, for the lives of many people. The whole Javanese people should know that Kiae Modjo rebelled not because of faith, but for his own advantage...
and promotion. Not for the benefit of the Javanese, but for himself. Not trying to prosper the Javanese as we built without humiliating the sultans, princes and imam. We do not disobey religion, we tolerate the practice of the ancestral religion. We safeguard the honor of the sultan, prince and ulama whom he ignored. We must continue the war against the rebels in order to punish those who refuse to protect the honor of sultans, princes and ulama. Our army will pursue and fight Kiai Modjo and those who rebelled with him. Those who remain under the lawful authority, or decide to reclaim legitimate authority, admit guilt and pledge allegiance, will be treated as friends and seen as allies. Those who obey the prince and side with us, will be given continuous loyal protection. The peaceful path is for the prosperity of the country, the fate of the children and wives, the maintenance of religion, maintaining faith and personal relationships. For that, our Lord, Lord of the army, the Gods support our efforts". The government’s appeal attacked both Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo was *ad hominem*, the hope was that it would awaken the public, but the call had no big influence.

Then came Mr. Stavers - a landlord who was popular with the natives - used the ability to access both parties to volunteer as a mediator between Diponegoro and the Dutch. With De Kock’s permission, Stavers met directly with Diponegoro to hear exactly what his hopes were. This information is very useful for the government (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 403). At the same time Stavers also made contact with Kiai Modjo and sent Imam Said Hassan, Achmad Bien Alie Katieb, Haji Hamdjah and Mas Prawiro Sastro to meet Kiai Modjo to hand over De Kock’s letter. Stavers’ efforts came to a halt during the last meeting in Djunot Village, Klaten, Kiai Modjo still did not want to give up (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 407–9). Stavers is said to have accompanied Mangkunegoro on an expedition to Selarong but found the base empty. They only found Panembahan Sangkee, who, according to the Dutch, was a shaman, the figure behind the development of the mythical image of Diponegoro (Sukirman 2008) and his struggles. His blessings and predictions were followed by the people. He was seditious with full of superstition, so that not a single prince dared him and made them rejoice in imprisonment or die on the ground (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 164–65).

The war continues. On September 25-28, 1828, Diponegoro paramilitary troops crossed Singosari, Djatinom to Puluwatu. The
Dutch military expeditions met 7,000 of them in the villages. As the paramilitary troops moved from the top of Balitiga heading towards the top Kamiriumbo, they were ambushed. The Resident of Kedoe, F. G. Walck reported that during the armed clash, Diponegoro's thigh was injured by a gunshot and his back was badly bruised. He was taken to Banjumening and escorted by 300 selected paramilitary forces (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 415–17). The expedition of Dutch army in the villages of Wedi and Kali Jali on the slopes of Mount Remo Jatinegoro, Bagelan, also in Kenko Village, Mount Bringon met a Diponegoro paramilitary forces platoon led by Haji Dragman. All imam and peoples were silent when the Dutch sought information, including the location of the head imam. Diponegoro paramilitary forces in Remo Jatinegoro were prepared to attack Banyumas, while 70 paramilitary forces in a village within the pesantren were ready to attack Kedu. The last paramilitary forces caught the Dutch, they retreated to the mountains (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 430–34). On July 15, 1826 Diponegoro was escorted by 30 paramilitary forces in Selomerto Village, 5-6 paal from Yogyakarta (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 171–76). In July 1826, the Diponegoro colony in Jongrongan, southwest of Dekso, was attacked by Cochius, killing 20 people. They retreated to Mount Kunca (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 161–62), through the villages of Cermo, Kembang Arum, Ampon and Grogol in the west of Progo, which is the base for around 1000 supporters.

When Van Geen was in Paras near Dekso on August 16, 1826, he said that Diponegoro was in Bagelan, behind Mount Pare between July 26-27, 1826. From where he was, he heard the sound of cannon fire coming from the east of the village, about 2 paal from his position. The Kalisat and Mukuan village heads did not know Diponegoro was there, even though they both sent rice and chicken to Godean Village the day before. Van Geen dispatched De Bast with two platoons of cavalry and a platoon of a hunting division to investigate further. Once they reached a wide canyon, the Dutch army had difficulty moving. There were many unarmed people on either side of the canyon. Within 1,000 feet, a gunman stood in a corner dressed all in white. With a platoon of the hunting division, Gilly De Montela gave chase. But only taking 50 feet away, armed men emerged from the canyon, screaming heroically as cold as ice as they attacked from various directions. Single youths and villagers rushed in at once. The Dutch couldn’t do much,
except shoot from the edge of the canyon. Towards dawn the next day, Van Geen saw that the atmosphere returned to calm. Down and forth with Diponegoro paramilitary forces watching them. Exhausted, Van Geen pulled his army towards Dekso, Progo, in a 2-3 day journey via Geguo and Tjelligong arriving on August 2, 1826 (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 168–71).

De Vexela on August 4, 1826 reported, Sollewyn’s military expedition with a mission to attack Selarong up to a distance of 1 paal from Bantul had no obstacles. The Jayang Sekars soldiers led by Bischoff, Madurese soldiers led by Poland and Prince Kamsa from Sumenep are joined the expedition. Arriving at Jekso near the Selarong Mountains, they were closely monitored from either side of the road, each estimated to be 400 Diponegoro paramilitary troops. Clashes erupted. Diponegoro looked glimpse, and it was enough to raise the morale of his paramilitary troops. The Dutch retreated as ammunition ran out. The Diponegoro paramilitary troops, which was estimated to be 6,000-7,000 armed with rifles (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 176–79), continued to attack vigorously along the road to Bantul and Krapyak. Weapons and ammunition were obtained from war booty or from attacking Dutch arms depots. The fighting continued for 7.5 hours until 4pm. To deal with Diponegoro’s forces which increased (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 179–81, 197–202, 228, 256), the Dutch increased their troop strength of 1,500-2,000 from China, Batavia, Anyer and Makassar to Java (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 181–86).

Under Sultan Hamengkubuwono the V or Sultan Anom, Yogyakarta was slumped by the war. That is also the reason why Sultan Hamengkubuwono II or Sultan Sepuh intends to return to the throne. On August 20, 1826 he had an audience with the Governor General at the Bogor Palace. He was received by Holsman. Apart from Dutch officials and princes, there was also the Dutch Governor for Malaysia, Roorda Van Eysinga. He filed a petition to be allowed to become the Sultan of Yogyakarta again for the sake of restoring the safety of Java (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 186–89, 188–95). De Kock wrote the petition and the terms of Dutch approval on it in a proclamation tex' (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 222–24). Nahuys used the petition as a propaganda tool to influence the rebel princes to return to the palace (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 236–41, 241–43). On September 20, 1826, Sultan Hamengkubuwono the II or Senopati Hingalogo Abdoel
Rahman Sayidin Ponotogomo Chalifat Allah returned to the throne at the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Marihandono 2010, 27–38). Sultan Hamengku Buwono II indicated that he always refused the Dutch intervention in the sultanate’s palace of Yogyakarta. He became rival of the Dutch governments because of his opinion that the Dutch had intervened too much in the cultural and noble life’s sultanate of Yogyakarta. After his coronation as a sultan in Yogyakarta in 1792, he kept his mind to guard the Java’s glorious tradition and the traditional power of the Sultan. This condition caused a great conflict between the Sultan and the Dutch government. Sultan HB II tried to refuse all the intervention of Dutch Government. As consequences of his character, the colonial government proposed to replace the Sultan with the crownprince. During his life, he accepted twice decoronation (in 1811 by Gouvernor General Daendels and in 1812 by Leutnant General Raffles.

But then, until the end of 1826 the situation had not changed. The intensity and scale of the attacks are still high. Diponegoro guerrilla while consolidating (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 267), secretly also visited the Surakarta Sunanate, where his paramilitary forces waited by camping at Kembang Arum. Tumenggung Tedjonegoro or the legendary Arfah (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 278–79) could not escorted him in this visit, died of serious injuries during the war in Djatinom. This secret visit immediately caught on with the Dutch. Before it became a big problem, Prince Mangkudiningrat immediately pledged to be ready to lead the war against Diponegoro by mobilizing the entire military force of Surakarta. The head of the Kedu leader who was involved in this secret visit case, swore under the Koran: “will be loyal to the Dutch and the rule of law of Yogyakarta. No longer involved in business with Diponegoro or other rebels, instead cooperating with the government and the sultan to overthrow Diponegoro if necessary by killing to restore Javanese peace” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 285–90, 291–94, 294–98).

On January 11, 1827, 1,500-2,000 Diponegoro paramilitary forces on Mount Taweng, Mount Glaga Malang and Kali Abu in the Menoreh and Kamidjaro mountains were joined by 300 imam and cavalry led by two sons: Ariosoerio Mataram and Soeriokesoemo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 308). The next day around 2,000 paramilitary forces led by his other sons, Soerang Logo and Danoekeesoemo were at Kali
Abu (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 308–10). But on January 30, Diponegoro’s sons - Ariosoerio Mataram and Ario Prang Wedono surrendered (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 311). Followed by another son, Dipokoesoemo in March (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 322–25). In early March Diponegoro was in Banyumeneng, with Mangkubumi, Suryo Bronto and Adi Soerio (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 312), then in Banyu Urip. When his trusted people surrendered, Wiro Patty appeared who controlled Kayu Puring, Grabag, Prapak, Jambu and Asinan between Kedu-Semarang with a total of 70-80 followers. After getting the title Raden Tumenggung Sunur Gumoor Gemuling Wessi, the number of followers increased to 400, including Setjo Winangoon and Kertojoedo. His influence extended to Ambarawa but was reported dead that month.

Kertojoedo replaces Wiro Patty. From his paramilitary troops post, the Dutch found Surat Undang-Undang (a letter of the law) written by Kiai Modjo and other documents in the name of Diponegoro which contained orders to mobilize districts in northern Java from Kedu. The document contains about how Islamic teachings were used as the basis for directing peoples to support Diponegoro, returning stolen goods to their owners without payment, collecting low taxes, not damaging waterways, etc. Anyone must respect and obey the letter holder, if they fight they will receive heavy sanctions such as being executed and their wife’s children are taken. It was also found that a Tumenggung Muhammad Kestsubo (Prapak District Imam) warrant for all the subjects of the Sultan (Diponegoro) that the Imam was not allowed to take more than 1/3 of the booty, while 2/3 was distributed to paramilitary forces (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 332–34). A similar letter by Kiai Modjo - and two similar writings from Prince Pakuningrat, the brother of Prince Mangkudiningrat - was also confiscated by the Dutch from Saidiman, Sub-Demang Sumben, Magelang (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 338). The letters written by Kiai Modjo above are said to be effective in mobilizing and organizing the confrontation. The number of followers continues to increase. The scale of the impact of the war also widened, although the average casualties were 50-100 killed and 50 villages destroyed in one operation in the Diponegoro fighting bases. During the fasting month of April 1827, when there was no war, Diponegoro stayed in Banyumeneng, west of Yogyakarta, busy performing his worship (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 344–46).
De Vexela and Bisschoff’s military operations in Klätten’s villages resulted in casualties - including Tumenggung Glaga. The Dutch confiscated documents on a list of 200 kiai and hajj, including Tumenggung Ali Bassa Kasan Besari and Tumenggung Jovinotto. Besari is the brother of Kiai Modjo who is in the military structure of Diponegoro with the rank of senopati (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 346–50, 353–56), equivalent to Sentot Prawirodirjo. He had the title Mas Tumenggung, who led 500 paramilitary forces and 200 of Diponegoro’s equestrian elite. He was involved in fighting in Upet and Kedaron in Puluwatu Klätten against the Dutch, assisted by Jayang Sekar cavalry led by Kallo from Bengal and the infanteri division from Ambon (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 355–57). After this incident, Diponegoro with 1,000 paramilitary forces left Banyumeneng for Mangon Ijo then Njeto around 7–8 pael south of Yogyakarta, heading for Pajang to meet Kiai Modjo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 364–67).

October 1827 Maas-Tjadie, son of Sultan Sepuh, or Prince Panega surrendered to Sollewyn. Panega wanted to go to the sultan, who was also his father, and Sollewyn escorted him. The reunion of the real sultan-son, who separated because of the war, was full of joy. Previously, four women also gave up and returned to the palace. Two of them were the daughters of Sultan Sepuh, who was also the widow of a tumenggung and the widow of a prince after their husband died on the battlefield (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 417–18). The report did not mention their names; strong conjecture that two of them were Raden Ayu Yudokusumo, the first daughter of Sultan Sepuh and Raden Ayu Serang, the former wife of the second sultan. However, the support of ulama, imam and princes for war was still high. In Bredjo Village, west of Yogyakarta, Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo fought alongside the kiai-santri, as well as in Passerwara and Grogol Village. Among them are Tumengong Agat Dola Nata Prawiro and Abd Dolah Abu Said, Diponegoro envoys when meeting with pro-Dutch kiai (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 424–26).

October to December 1827, Tumenggung Ali Bassa Kasan Besari, paramilitary troops posted in Grei Village, guerrilla in Pajang villages with 300 paramilitary forces (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 470–77). Dealing with modern Dutch war equipment made the kiai and santri vulnerable to becoming victims or demoralized them, among
others, Haji Ismail, Haji Yunus and Haji Salim. Leaders of Diponegoro paramilitary forces in Klaten such as Ingabei Surodiwirio from Giosian and Ronggo Djokrowidjoyo and Bangio Winangen from Passang also surrendered. The pro-Dutch Solo ulama, Kiai Bin Ali, continued to seek negotiations with the leaders of Diponegoro paramilitary forces to surrender. At that time Diponegoro, Kiai Modjo and Prince Ingabei were in Banyumeneng, west of Yogyakarta (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 435–37). But at the end of December 1827, Diponegoro’s governance structure, personnel and power network were scattered in various areas of the Java War. In Tuban, at the end of December 1827 a complete list of Diponegoro officials was found, from the regent, tumenggung, wedono, demang to the head of the village. A similar list was found in Bangil, which indicates that Diponegoro officials were complete in all areas of the Java War.

On January 6, 1828, Gilly led the Dutch hunter division wearing a cloak over Diponegoro’s main paramilitary forces. Early in the morning they infiltrated the Diponegoro paramilitary troops post in Basar Pandjong Sari without being recognized, they even had time to chat with the paramilitary troops. He freely killed 20 main leaders of Diponegoro paramilitary troops, such as Kantjel Nantan Stroderdjo and Djiemenang, son of Patih Oerawan, and confiscated his keris, pistols and ammunition (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 16–17). From Ngawi, it was reported that 3,000 Diponegoro paramilitary troops surrounded from various directions. The attack prompted the Dutch to deploy their military forces in Ngawi, Wonorejo and Ponorogo. There are also about 3,000 Diponegoro paramilitary forces in Kedu (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 42–48) led Ali Bassa and Kerta Panalassan (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 57–59). The Dutch consolidated a joint military supported by palace soldiers to the villages of Bazar Gede, Imogiri and Pulokadang. The villages they crossed from night to morning were scorched. The Dutch faced Prince Suriobronto, Abdul Majid and Abdul Samsun in Pulokadang with 800 paramilitary troops (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 41–44).

Early February 1828, Tumenggung Mangundipuro - a figure who had protected Diponegoro - together with his wife, family and followers surrendered. His wife was the daughter of the late Prince Ingabei, the eldest brother of Sultan Sepuh (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 67–68). Meanwhile, the son of Diponegoro led 2,000 paramilitary
troops moving to Ledok from the Kaliwiro route, while Tumenggung Danukusumo led the paramilitary troops to Bodjonegoro. The Dutch prepare an interception step on Mount Tawang (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 78–80), but Diponegoro's sons, Sumoatmodjo and Danukusumo moved to Wonosobo and Segalo to attack Karang Malang at night (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 67–68; 81–82, 87–89, 103–7), also Bringin, Koripan, Lebak and Kaliwiro. Diponegoro himself moved around Banyumas to attack Kretek and Wonosobo. The Dutch army post in Gombor was attacked by Sentot Ali Bassa, Kerto Pangalassan and Kertonegoro with 500 paramilitary troops.

In the midst of incessant reports of war and espionage, an Arab ulama named Syeikh Abdul Achmad bin Abdullah Al-Anshary with 2 Raden Bagus, 2 imam and 50 peoples arrived in Paesan towards Solo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 74–76). Two years later, De Kock, through Kraft, asked this ulama to become the mediator. In order to freely carry out his role, he was asked to live together at the Diponegoro paramilitary troops post in Paesan, Bubutan and Segalo villages, south of Tjinkawa Fort. Half a month later Syeikh Al-Anshary accompanied by Prince Ario Blitar and his followers arrived in Paesan to hand over official Dutch letters to Ronodiredjo, Pandjie, Rongo and Ingabehi. But the mission failed (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 197–202). On March 19, 1828, information was obtained about Diponegoro and 2,000 paramilitary troops in Langon while Prince Pakuningrat and 1,500 paramilitary troops in Pucungan, Jamus and Karangkopek, Kedu. Kiai Modjo was reported with Diponegoro this time. The Dutch are ready to intercept their route at Borobudur and their attack on them resulted in many casualties, including Tumenggung Setjonegoro (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 122-126,140-141).

In April 1828, the Regent of Muning Rembang and his son surrendered to the Resident of Surakarta. He swore allegiance under the Quran: “For the sake of Allah, lā ilāha illallāh, The Omniscient of all mysteries, that they are possible; abundant in His grace on earth and full of love in Heaven; The Omniscient Essence which is uncertain and certain; with Him I swear with a pure and sincere heart: that His damnation will come upon me if unfaithfulness is in my body, that is, if I am unfaithful and deny it; The wrath of Allah descended on me, so that I did not get the intercession of Rasūlullāh Muhammad SAW, who became the foundation of peace, as well as the sense of peace of his four
friends, Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali; I do not enjoy the blessings of all the *ulama* who are resting in their graves in Java; also from His Excellency Susuhunan Surakarta Adiningrat; God’s wrath fell on me, so that all the satiety of the food I ate disappeared, the clothes I wore became worn out and when I came back to life at home, I was like an angry anger to mankind” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 136–37).

Cleerens designed an expedition to Allang Allang Ombor, because one of the son of Diponegoro came to the village to celebrate the *Grebeg Suro* celebration. Inviting all the leaders of the paramilitary troops. The house where Diponegoro’s son lives is full of food. The invitees rolled back their steps when they learned that the place had been occupied by the Dutch. A clash between the two was inevitable, which resulted in Diponegoro’s side causing more casualties (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 140–43). May 1828 there was guerrilla warfare thousands Diponegoro paramilitary troops and pursuit by Dutch soldiers in Lowano by combing the Bongowonto river to Gombor, after his military post in Bagelan was attacked twice (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 160–63). Van Nauta, who led the chase, found the bodies of Haji Inson Kamat, Haji Mohamad, Panji Dedo Borbonso and Rongo from Dessa Sontjin. Meanwhile De Vexela deployed troops to Ledok, Pakkem Village, Grogolam and Sempo, Banyumas to pursue 600-700 Diponegoro paramilitary troops, until they fled to Bedoijo. Meanwhile 800-1000 Diponegoro paramilitary troops in Thilian Village, after being attacked, shifted to Kembang Arum (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 167–70). Imam Musba and Mas Lurah continue to fight on a small scale with a strength of 100-150 soldiers based in the Segondul mountains. Wiggers, Pekalongan and Kedu commanders, managed to force them out of the location (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 175–76). In April 1828 it was revealed that the fighting movement in the Yogyakarta Residency was secretly supported by the Regents (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 181–82), which caused the number of paramilitary troops in Tegal Sari Village to increase by more than 300 (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 185–86).

The Resident of Kedu reported that Wongsoprawiro or Prince Mangkuningrat when he served as Tumenggung Bligo, along with 12 of his paramilitary troops surrendered. He is the brother of Tumengung Setjonegoro, the head of Diponegoro’s highly respected paramilitary troops. In the last few months the two have always been seen together.
Setjonegoro is also willing to give up if Prawiro is treated well. Followed by Demang Djamose, Tumenggung Rongo in the Probolingo district, with the title Setrodinongo - the landlord who controlled 25 junks - as well as Prince Ario Papak, who has the title Prince Weriodiningrat, the brother of Prince Adipati Mangkudiningrat, with his wife, five children and 20 servants (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 170–71). Maas Singo Wongso, Singo Merto and Kiai Rowek were involved in the rebellion of Kiai Mankowatie with 80 paramilitary troops in Kaseshek Village, Tagal, arrested in December 1827. The rebellion itself was thwarted by the soldiers of the Pamalang Regent and the Jayang Sekar detachment (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 172).

Nahuys was concerned when news broke that in April 1828 that Tumenggung Wongsodipura and his son Mas Rongowarsito, as officials of the Surakarta Palace, were indicted to side with Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo. Dipura held a prestigious post during the reign of His Excellency Susuhunan Bagus. Both of them enjoyed great influence in Surakarta, thereby successfully influencing high-ranking Surakarta Kasunanan officials to side with him. They orchestrated a revolt against legitimate officials in the area, planned attacks on the fortresses of Solo, Sukowati and Pajang with the support of village officials. Nahuys calls it a conspiracy with evil intentions that must be thwarted. When the plan was completed, Warsito and other figures such as Jugo Judo, Singo Wedono, Kerto Sarie, Tinongso and Tambang Judo were arrested. This last figure escapes and then joins Diponegoro (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 175–78).

To secure Pekalongan and Bagelan, the Dutch established a security post at the foot of Mount Persodo. This area is the base for Diponegoro Anom whose paramilitary troops post is in Kowo Baijem. The post was attacked by 500 Diponegoro paramilitary troops which triggered a military expedition. Especially after information was obtained that Dionegoro Anom, Ali Bassa and Kerto Pangalasan with their 1,000 paramilitary troops would move to the area. The Dutch confiscated a sword with silver and gold hilt made in 1749 that belonged to Diponegoro Anom, 7 guns, 5 pistols, several boxes of ammunition, a Tumengong Wiro Potro stamp with a silver handle, 18 horse saddles, a crown, a bayonet, several spears, one of which was beautifully carved decorated with gold and silver supposedly belonged to Diponegoro Anom, etc. (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 202–8).
As the Dutch military expedition increased, the rural areas to the west, south, north and east of Yogyakarta remained as Diponegoro's strong base. The Dutch military expedition to this area was attacked by 400 Diponegoro paramilitary troops in Gyetio Village, Kanigoro and Bantul regions, led by Prince Surioibronto and Abdul Samsun, along with several influential tumenggung. The Dutch expedition from Bantulkarang to Sumuran was attacked by 800 paramilitary troops from Soriobronto. Meanwhile in Bantul, there were paramilitary troops led by women of high rank, with booty in the form of gold and precious stones estimated to be equivalent to 2,000 Spanish currency (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 217–21). This is not the first case of women being involved in the Java War. The mother of a Diponegoro paramilitary troops commander in East Bagelan, Basah Joyosundargo, refused to let her child surrender. He chose to fight when his paramilitary troops post on Mount Persodo was invaded by the Dutch (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 202).

The military strength of Diponegoro’s son, Ario Mataram, in Kitjiwan and Ketjambon at the foot of Mount Merapi Pajang increased (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 214–17). July 1828, attacks on each other were still ongoing in Banyumas, Minoreh, Bligo and Bagellen (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 226–28). In that area, Diponegoro Anom’s paramilitary troops, Djoyo Sendergo and Kerto Pengalassan moved towards Winko, Lengis and Boro Village (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 220–24). Prince Mulyo Kusumo, the son of Prince Bey - the sultan’s eldest brother - gave up on Prince Mangundipuro’s efforts. From him obtained information that “Diponegoro, who is always on prayer, fasting and live on penance will continue his struggle. His daily tasks were left to the governor Danuredjo and Danukesumo, two of his trusted people. There was a cold war between Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 224–25). Other information states that Diponegoro is live on penance in Bindo Cave, leaving his daily affairs to Mangkubumi. Another news was that Diponegoro was in Sambiroto, still saddened by the death of Ali Bassa Nottodirjo because he was injured in the war (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 229).

Imam Musba and Mas Lurah are in Kalibeber, near Sari Mountain. About 50 Dutch soldiers starting combing from Pegaden to Kedu clashed with 400 soldiers in the Raute forest, which made the Dutch lose 40 soldiers along with their weapons, while the wounded soldiers
were handed over to the Dutch for treatment. Meanwhile the leaders of Diponegoro’s army in Bagelan, Purwokerto and Semarang surrendered (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 238–42). On August 9, 1828, 290 elite soldiers of Sultan Tidore, led by Major Saifuddin landed in Semarang (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 246). Previously Sultan Sulaiman and 700 Buton soldiers also landed. The actions of Sultan Buton in helping the government outside their territory were praised by the Dutch as “proof of loyalty and goodwill”. Especially at that time Buton was attacked by a severe cholera outbreak (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 246–49).

Stavers heard of a traveler kiai who was gaining a large following in the Surakarta. There were rumors that he was linked to Kiai Modjo. For the services of Demang Brodjo Sentiko from Singosari, contact was established with the kiai and then brought to Surakarta for questioning. It is known that he was named Djoyokusumo or Mertodjiwo and was not involved with Kiai Modjo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 260). At the same time the Dutch received information about the positions of Mangkubumi and Adi Negoro in Wonopeti Village, although Imam Musba and Mas Lurah are still missing (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 260–63). In Progo appears Djohor Miskien, an influential leader of the paramilitary troops who is soon on the list of dangerous figures. Prince Abdul Kareem Ariobintoro alias Ario Purwokusumo met with the Resident of Yogyakarta asking for protection because he was sentenced to death by Diponegoro at the suggestion of Kiai Modjo. He fled before the execution was carried out. To the Resident of Yogyakarta, he promised to serve the government, even without the title of prince (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 269–72).

In November 1828, Mas Lurah sent Kiai Ahmad, his colleague, to convey to the government that he wanted to surrender. Mas Loerah and his two sons and 110 followers moved to leave the Prauw mountains to return to Pegaden, his hometown (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 309). After Mas Lurah surrendered, there was no more confrontation from Diponegoro which had a rebellious power in the area (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 401). Arriving in Magelang, Mas Lurah promised to help find Imam Musba, Mohammad Kastuba and other Diponegoro paramilitary troops leaders, dead or alive (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 393–94). Meanwhile, Kastuba and 20 of his followers surrendered in December 1828 on the assistances of Ronggo
from Bandongan. Kastuba is the leader of Prapak (Medono) who was appointed by Diponegoro as the tumenggung of the Kedu Residency (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 400). However, the effectiveness of security governance was consolidated, both in Surakarta under the control of Prince Adipati Ario Kusumoyoedo and in Yogyakarta under Prince Surio Mataram.

The rainy season benefits Diponegoro. The modern weaponry and professionalism of the Dutch army could not do much, which was hampered by the watery terrain (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 349–53). Taking advantage of this rainy season, Diponegoro’s paramilitary troops moved swiftly because they were divided into groups of 200-500 mans. Several times clashes in west Yogyakarta, Diponegoro always escaped attacks. Likewise Diponegoro Anom (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 296), Prince Bey and Alibasa Kerto Pengalasan who moved from villages in Progo with 1,100 paramilitary troops (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 297–302). Escaping from the Dutch, Diponegoro is strongly assumed of being in Kedung Jebok, Progo, where all Diponegoro paramilitary troops in Gamplong have joined him. Then they are moved to Imogiri and Pajang. In October 1828, Diponegoro, Mangkubumi, Kiai Modjo and Alibasa Nottoprawiro continued their guerrillas in the villages around Mount Petir.

In October 1828 the Dutch continued to communicate with Kiai Modjo to surrender, when he with his 800 mans moved in Begellen and Ungaran (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 368–74). In November 1828 Kiai Modjo and Roeps made contact with each other, there were an early indication of surrender (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 252–53). Roeps reported communication with Kiai Modjo to Nahuys (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 254–61). When Nahuys reported to De Kock, Roeps, who was fluent in Javanese, was praised for his services. De Kock asks for the military operation to continue, while keeping negotiations open. The terms and conditions of punishment for Kiai Modjo were determined directly by the Governor General. Such as the jurisprudence of Kedu Resident, Valck, against Mas Lurah (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 380–81).

However, Kiai Modjo’s envoy arrived to deliver Diponegoro’s letter that he was still determined to continue the war. The envoy was asked to make an oral statement before De Kock and the Resident of Surakarta as evidence in court if needed. Despite Diponegoro’s stance,
Kiai Modjo went his own way with the intention of going to Modjo, Pajang, to convey the results of his negotiations with Roeps to his kiai as well as his paramilitary troops leaders. The plan was canceled for security reasons. For the Dutch, if Kiai Modjo intended to surrender, further peace talks in order to maintain the spirit of Islam, peace and public order, it would be wiser if the meeting was to be held in the vicinity of Yogyakarta than elsewhere (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 366).

The dynamics on the ground are moving very fast. Roeps reported that Kiai Modjo through his envoy wanted to meet and speak directly with Nahuys. Kiai Modjo told Roeps that he entered the battlefield because he was swallowed up by Diponegoro’s promise to restore faith and lively Islam in Java. After the war began, it was revealed that Diponegoro’s real aim was to consolidate and organize forces to become sultan (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 194–96). After a thorough conversation, Kiai Modjo conveyed his conclusions to Roeps: ”It’s clear now. I now realize that the Dutch is far from intending to suppress or abolish Islam, instead it honestly protects our religion. Blood shed because of war in order to defend and glorify religious teachings need not be maintained anymore. I, as a loyal teacher of the Sultan (Diponegoro), really give advice so that we seek peace. If the Sultan does not want to make peace, it will prove that he is only using weapons for the sake of his own greatness and resulting in a major disaster for the island of Java” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 226). The peace proposal, according to Kiai Modjo, was based on: ”the sincere wish of all faithful Muslims to end the bloodshed” (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 226). Obtained information that Diponegoro was angry when Kiai Modjo advised him to make peace. The conversation between the two in Mlangi resulted in a heated debate. Kiai Modjo and Diponegoro failed to agree. In the aftermath of Diponegoro asked Kiai Modjo to leave his war. Kiai Modjo agreed and returned to Pajang with Ghazali, Kasan Besari, several respected leaders and the best 500 mans. At the end of the conversation, Roeps suggested Kiai Modjo to tell Nahuys by himself. Kiai Modjo’s sudden departure to Padjang left his wife and most of his family members behind and they soon followed him wherever Kiai Modjo was (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 391–92).

Observing the dynamics between Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo and developments on the battlefield, De Kock and van Geen viewed that negotiations could not be continued if not on a serious basis. Military
Operation orders are still carried out, but short after, information was received which was very encouraging to Nahuys. He conveyed this golden opportunity to related officials (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 366). De Kock reports to the Minister of State for Colonies and the Commissioner General in the Netherlands from Magelang, November 13, 1828. According to a report by De Vexela, there was a movement of Kiai Modjo and his 500 mans (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 35–36) between 11-12 November at around 2am. Kiai Modjo’s entourage was about to reach Banjar. The Dutch army approached Kiai Modjo with his 500 mans in Babetan Village, Progo, with guns ready to shoot. Kiai Modjo, who was about to surrender, did not fight back. They were then escorted to Klaten. De Kock ordered Nahuys and De Vexela to immediately go to Klaten to take the next steps (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 367).

De Vexela is ready to welcome Kiai Modjo and his entourage. He coordinated with the Chairman of the High Court of Klaten and Prambanan, Babetan jurisdiction, Progo, the location where Kiai Modjo was arrested. Kiai Modjo and his mans are still wielded their weapons despite surrendering or being captured. Arriving in Klaten on November 14, 1828, Kiai Modjo was greeted with ṣalawat badar. The Dutch then resolved to disarm their weapons, because they considered it a spiritual song that indicated Kiai Modjo won the war. Kiai Modjo along with 40 important kiai and imam were directed separately into the residency fortress, while the rest was divided into two under the supervision of the tumenggung. Kiai Modjo’s room was specially prepared because Nahuys wanted to speak to him directly that he had to hand over his weapon. The conversation heated up, both of them insisted. Kiai Modjo strongly refused, Nahuys remain insisted. The other prisoners heard their loud voices. Nahuys asked De Vexela and Lady to be alert and not leave the residency area, until the disarmament was considered complete. Nahuys is ready for the worst possibility if the disarmament process turns into bloodshed, such as the disarming incident of Prince Amir in the same place in the era of Governor General Daendels. Kiai Modjo relented by handing over his weapons, while persuading the kiai and imam to hand over their weapons as well, so that 300 weapons such as keris, spear and 50 guns were collected. Kiai Modjo along with several kiai and imam were then escorted to Surakarta. Despite their status as prisoners and without weapons, Kiai Modjo’s entourage was...
still respected as a leader by being greeted with great fanfare along the way. Meanwhile the regents, tumenggung and other officials gathered at the Surakarta Residency Building to congratulate the Resident on his achievement in capturing Kiai Modjo.

On November 15, 1828, Nahuys issued a list of prisoners. The name Kiai Modjo is positioned as the leader of the 400 imam, kiai and other paramilitary troops. The names of the other 100 ex-paramilitary troops were not mentioned there. Kiai Mlangi and Ajie Mustapha and several commanders escaped when the group reached Surakarta (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 381–87). Kiai Modjo along with 60 more kiai and imam were then separated from 400 other prisoners to be sent to Jakarta, via Semarang, to face further legal procedures. Resting for a day in Surakarta, Kiai Modjo and his family and 60 kiai and imam were escorted to Salatiga (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 381–91). On November 20, 1828 the group was sent to Batavia via the port of Semarang on the merchant ship Mercurie. On November 28, 1828, the group arrived in Batavia, the room for the detention of Kiai Modjo had been prepared (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 394). The Governor General’s decision issued that Kiai Modjo and his group of prisoners were exiled to Minahasa, which until now has formed the habitus of Kampung Jawa Tondano (Babcock 1981b, 74–92; Kembuan 2016; Syahid 2017).

The next round of the Java War belonged to Diponegoro entirely. In November 1828, information was obtained that there was a movement of soldiers on the edge of the Progo River, then camped at Mangiran, going to Guguo, Bakalan and then meeting other soldiers in Gading Village. Among the cavalry, a handsome rider was seen who was supposed to be Diponegoro himself. In the morning the troupe of military troops arrived in the mountains south of Merapi, on the rows of the Opak River between Bantul and Sleman. The Diponegoro group was attacked by the Dutch who killed two of its leaders, one of which was Tumenggung Sumo Admodjo. Diponegoro escaped, Prince Bey and Diponegoro Anom hampered the Dutch military movement by burning the villages they passed. The Dutch military movement was also hampered by the paramilitary troops led by Sentot’s brother Prawirodirdjo (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 395–400; Soekanto 1951). Until this period, Diponegoro still received the support of the Regent of Semarang, R. Adipati Surohadimenggolo, who nurtured
Raden Saleh from his childhood until 1817. While Raden Sukur, Raden Saleh’s cousin, also fought against the Dutch, until he was arrested and exiled (Bachtar, Carey, and Onghokham 2009).

On November 7, 1829, Raden Ali Bassa Abdul Mustafa Sentot Prawirodirdjo was stationed in Bantul. Kiai as well as paramilitary troops leaders such as Penghulu Ibrahim, Tumenggung Haji Mustapha, Raden Tumenggung De Putero and Kiai Guru Mlangi who had been hiding in the villages joined him (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 244). Sentot escorted Diponegoro guerrillas almost in entire war (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 155–58). Although he saw that the influence and support for the Diponegoro war was still large, he considered that Diponegoro was increasingly being depressed by the war (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 39–40). Since being in Bagelan, Diponegoro has been in contact with Cleerens to meet De Kock (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 83). De Kock mentioned that the war with Diponegoro, as well as with Prince Ario Surerokusumo, the son of Mangkubumi (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 244), was still going on, even though the war made all parties suffer, the environment was destroyed and casualties (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 217–18). In 1829 Mangkubumi and Sentot Prawirodirjo surrendered (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 219–21), several weapons and important documents were confiscated from both of them.

On February 20, 1830 Diponegoro met Cleerens at Remo Kamal, Bagelan (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 83, 286). During the meeting Cleerens suggested that Diponegoro stay in Manoreh while waiting for De Kock to arrive from Batavia. On March 28, 1830, De Kock arrived in Magelang. On the second day of ‘Īd al-‘Ītr, Diponegoro met De Kock at the Magelang residency (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 290–91). Their meeting took place in an atmosphere of a truce. Being carried away by the Eid atmosphere, Diponegoro considered the meeting as a joyful gathering, but that was not the case with De Kock. In the middle of the conversation, the meeting atmosphere became tense, heated up. De Kock presses Diponegoro to stop the war. The request was denied. A moment later De Kock ordered his security forces to arrest Diponegoro, who was only holding a prayer beads. Diponegoro could not do much, his weapons and guards had been disarmed beforehand. The atmosphere of ‘Īd al-‘Ītr’s friendship turned into a heartbreaking arrest of Diponegoro. Out of the Magelang Residency, waiting for the bendi to deliver Diponegoro in the next episode of his life.
The sad atmosphere that touched the blue and jolted the mind in the atmosphere of Eid was depicted in Raden Saleh’s painting (Carey 1982, 1–25). His painting marks the starting point for the growth of proto-nationalism that invites partiality, resistance and sympathy for the Indonesian people to this day (Krauss 2005, 359–94). The Java War was one of the seeds of the struggle for nationalism against colonialism (Knight 2013, 2014; Ricklefs 1981, 104–14). The spirit of Islam sprinkled during the Java War in order to liberate the nation due to the sedimentation of the Islamic faith that lasted for centuries, which is the religion embraced by the majority because it always inspires the population to defend the nation and others with its strong social networks (Salim 2012, 75–118). That is the logical fruit of the centers of Islamic power in the archipelago to become centers of Islamic studies and literature from the 14th to the 20th century, turning them into a formula of Islamization that was full of scientific enlightenment (Laffan 2013, 15). The absence of this insight on the Dutch side helped to explore the gaping distance between the colonial mind and the mindset of Islamic figures so that the latter were moved to fight against it. From the 17th to the 20th centuries, the two were like friends in conflict (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008; Steenbrink 1995).

The day after Diponegoro was arrested, Java was no longer the same as before. On March 29, 1830, a public celebration was held in the form of laying the groundwork for the construction of a church in Surakarta. Civil and military officials, including Sunan, Muslim princes and officials, came together with Christians. For Nahuys, the mutual collaboration initiative to donate money and building materials cannot be rejected. The effort to build the church came from a missionary, but it was received enthusiastically by Muslims. For Nahuys this form of extraordinary tolerance for Javanese Islam, its character is different from Turkey, Arab, Hindustan or other Muslim countries where there is a dividing wall between Islam and Christianity (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1958, 163–65).

The history of Diponegoro’s struggle has accomplished. On the sidelines of the celebration, Nahuys received information that the trip to escort Diponegoro as a prisoner was on time. After arriving in Ungaran, Diponegoro was then escorted to the Semarang Residency Building. On April 5, 1830, the Pollux ship left for Batavia and arrived on April 11, 1830. He resides in the Stadhuis Building (now: Fatahillah...
Museum Building) while waiting for the legal decisions of the Governor General, van den Bosch. On April 30, 1930, a verdict from van den Bosch was issued, Diponegoro and his wife, Raden Ayu Retnaningsih, Tumenggung Dipasana and his wife, as well as Mertaleksana, Banteng Wereng and Nyai Sotaruna were exiled to Manado. They arrived there on May 30, 1830 and were detained at Fort Amsterdam (Carey 2008, 657–759, 2014a, 71–75; Van Dijk 1995).

Once the war ended, what the Dutch faced was how to replace the costs of the war so far. Again, in the name of maintaining sustainable security for the “prosperity and welfare of the Javanese” the agreement between the Dutch and the Sunan of Surakarta, Pakubuwono VII was renewed on June 14 and 22, 1830. The agreement was signed preceded by high-level talks between the two in Magelang, April 10, 1830 (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 189–93). On September 27, 1830, an understanding was obtained between the Dutch and the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta and was strengthened by involving the princes in the two palaces based on the spirit of the Giyanti Treaty (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 206–16, 216–19).

Conclusion

The struggle of Javanese War figures who ignited a narrative of independence wrapped in culture and religion, inevitably gained chronic sympathy, widespread support evenly and rooted in villages and remote areas. The issues of independence and awareness of ancestral history are met with a spirit of faith and Islam that has been well sedimented for centuries. The issue of independence and restoration of ancestral culture also brings syncretic Islam with orthodoxy Islam on the battlefield. Also meeting a network of priyayi, abangan (syncretic Islam) and kiai from the pesantren made the main war figures become socially respected and religiously authoritative figures.

The seriousness and sincerity of the Dutch did not seem to stand out in understanding the moral struggle of the Javanese War figures. Reluctance to understand the doctrine, spirit and experience of Islam, instead emphasizing its militaristic perspective, also prevented Dutch policy from being assertive. It is well known that faith and Islam serve as the justification for starting or ending wars. This opened an opportunity for Kiai Modjo to use fiqah as the basis for regulating the use of ghanima. Sentot Prawirodirjo termed it the Perang Sabiillah.
(a war in the way of Allah). It is also open to the orthodoxy viewpoint that faith and Islam are the motivation for war, a source of enthusiasm, a basis for thinking and an identity which then spreads throughout the war zone to strengthen ties and expand the mass support network.

The ulama and kiai as a santri who became leaders of the paramilitary troops were named imam (imam al-amr), in addition to other “profane” terms such as tumenggung, etc., to give space to the organs of war as well as accommodate those who were not from among the santri. Meanwhile, the Dutch response was in the form of an Islamic, cultural and moral narrative that tended to be formal and apologetic. Yet what he was facing was a complex moral disillusionment. The Dutch could not realize this feeling and then use it as material for policy making with a fair will. Islam and Islamic procedures were used as means of legitimizing the character of colonial power, such as in the oath-taking ceremonial procession. Both kiai, imam and leaders who sided with the Dutch were often merely be used as diplomacy and negotiation mediators. In fact, the Dutch used Islamic and cultural narratives to attack Diponegoro and Kiai Modjo and the prince-kiai-santri who stood on their side.
Endnotes

1. As the legitimate heir of the Kartosuro Palace, Raden Mas Said was left behind by Prince Mangkubumi, who turned political by co-signing the Giyanti Treaty. Disappointed Raden Mas Said launched resistance against three parties at once: the Dutch, Surakarta and Yogyakarta. He was nicknamed Pangeran Samber Nyawa because his resistance was difficult to anticipate. Instead, he caused many casualties on the part of the opponent (Kartodirdjo 2005, 19; Revolta 2008, 132).

2. Since childhood, she was raised by her great grandmother, Ratu Ageng or Kanjeng Ratu Kadospaten, the wife of Sultan Hamengkubuwono the I. She is an elite Javanese Sufi woman who has 4 murshids from the Syattariyah Tarekat. Diponegoro also became acquainted with the science of fiqh, tafsir, sufism, history and Islamic political literature through the Kartadirjo family in the Yogyakarta Sultanate (Carey 2008, 97–105).

3. Diponegoro called by M.C. Ricklefs (1974a, 227–58) as a prominent prince and mystical figure. Based on the three volumes of Diponegoro’s own work, Babad Dipanagara: Serat Babad Dipanagara karanganipun swargi Kangjeng Pangeran Arya Dipanagara piyambak: Nyariosaken wiwit remenisipun dhateng agami Islam tuwin dadosing prang ageng nganot dunungipun kakendinghangaken dhateng Menadho.

4. The Muslim name is Muhammad Khalifah or Bagus Caliph. In Kampung Jawa Tondano it is named Mbaub Guru or Kias Guru. Called Kias Modjo because he founded a pesantren in Modjo’s land (Pulukadang 2017). Joining the Java War was not his first involvement in the independence movement, when Java was under the British (1811-1816), Kias Modjo became Sunan Surakarta’s secret envoy to Bali. The British took Kias Modjo into custody because of this case (Dipanagara 1981 endnote 110; See also Carey 1974, 21).

5. A letter containing the genealogy of Kampung Jawa Tondano, written in Manado, December 15, 1919, mentions that Kias Modjo is the descendant of an 8th generation of the Majapahit Kingdom kiai. The letter is now stored on Leiden University Library Oriental Collection (Carey 1981, 261–62).

6. Tololiu Hermanus Willem Dotulong led the Tulungan militia. Based on the contract between Abraham Dotulong and J. Kawilarang and Daniel Francois Willem Pietermaat, The Resident of Manado on December 23, 1927, this militia left for Java on March 29, 1829 with 1,421 personnel (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 86). Dotulong with the rank of Major assisted by three captains from the main army contributor district. Each captain is assisted by a lieutenant (Wenas 2007, 51). A total of 30 Minahasa militias were recorded as assisting Dutch officers at the end of the Java War (Carey 2014b, 88–89; Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836b, 245–47; Schouten 1987, 119–41).

7. The rejection was allegedly because Diponegoro had built Tegal Rejo as a center for religious education and a community of morality santri. Diponegoro transformed himself into a priyayi-santri by marrying Raden Ayu Retno Madubrangta, the second daughter of Kias Gede from Dadhapan Village, Tempel, on the Yogyakarta-Kedu border (Carey 2008, 97).

8. The story of Diponegoro to Lieutenant J. H. Knoerle who escorted his voyage to Manado in 1830. The manuscript of the story later became Johannes van den Bosch’s private collection entitled Document No. 391 (Babcock 1981b, 76, footnote 6).

9. Paal is a unit of measure for distance. 1 paal = 1,506,943 meters or 1,5 kilometers. Distance markers planted along Dutch-era Javanese roads were made in paal sizes before being replaced by kilometers (km) around 1925.

10. Mlangi was founded by KH Mlangi which has now developed into a spiritual village with dozens of Islamic boarding schools and mosques (Arifin 2015, 351–72). The village grew according to the dynamics of the spread of Islam (Yuli 2019, 1–7). The boundary is
marked by the Pathok Negoro Mosque or the Kagungan Dalem Mosque in the Great State area in Mlangi (Abror 2016, 63–79).

11. What is meant is a Lieutenant Governor General.

12. At the suggestion of the Sultan’s mother to the Resident of Yogyakarta, Adrian Mauritz Theodorus de Salis, Diponegoro and Mangkubumi - Diponegoro’s uncle - were appointed guardians of Sultan Hamengkubuwono the V, who ascended the throne on Thursday, December 19, 1822, who was 2 years old until he was considered mature to lead on January 20, 1836. De Salis was waiting for orders Governor General Van der Capellen, especially in terms of granting recognition by confirming Sultan Hamengkubono the V as the successor of Sultan Hamengkubuwon the IV. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, Danurejo the IV, was asked to continue carrying out his daily duties (Carey 2008, 505-9).

13. The Governor-General on April 3, 1826 awarded Kruis van de Militaire Willem Orde class 3, a merit star to a native nobleman for his courage and loyalty to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 130).

14. In 1811 sided with the British during the conflict with the Dutch

15. Van Geen’s military and bureaucratic career, see Amean (1997, 17).

16. This palace was abandoned by the Sultan Agung because he was expelled by his son and then the sultan died in Tegal (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835b, 134–37; Pigeaud and De Graaf 1976).

17. Paramilitary troops leaders in certain districts within the Diponegoro structure.

18. Strong suspicion is Sumeroredjo or Semorowidjoyo.

19. Dutch political language uses the third pronoun “we” and “us” or those who take the Dutch side, and using “they” and “he” to refer to those who are considered enemies and often use the word “you” to refer to the Javanese.

20. The complete of the government’s appeal, announced from Salatiga, September 26, 1827 see Nahuys (1835b, 405–8).

21. Authoritative author on ethnology, history, geography and politics (Eijlinga 1942).

22. The complete contents of the petition, see Nahuys (1835b, 187–90).

23. The proclamation consists of 12 articles (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 116–24). Previously, Sultan Hamengkubuwono the II also signed an agreement with Thomas S. Raffles in August 1812 which consisted of 23 articles (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1835a, 124–30).


25. Based on the special report of the Resident of Yogyakarta (1831-1841), Frans Gerhardus Valck, Carey (2014b, 78–79; 2016) said that they were the wives of Javanese officials. They played a role in helping Diponegoro paramilitary troops in the villages carrying logistics, pouring ammunition, etc. Some of them joined in Prajurit Estri or pasukan Langenkusumo (Soldier’s Wife) has great combat abilities and heroic (Kumar 2008).

26. Habib Syekh Abdul Achmad bin Abdullah Al-Anshary was an Arab trader between Semarang - Yogyakarta. He is from Jeddah and married to the family of Prince Ario Blitar - the son of the 1st Sultan Hamengkubuwono. Shaykh al-Ansari is one of Diponegoro’s connections in his network of religious teachers in Tegal Rejo. He did not take sides in the Java War, but his stepson, named Achmad, was killed while defending the Selarong Headquarters from the Dutch invasion on October 25, 1825 (Carey 2008, 101, footnote 18, 129).

27. Nahuys (1836b, 11) called this ulama as an information provider


29. Unit of measure that applies during the royal era, 1 jung is equivalent to 4 bau or
approximately 28,386 m².

30. In order to formulate a more detailed security plan, the Dutch attended a meeting in Tjinkawa on September 28, 1828 (Huibert Gerard Nahuys 1836a, 325–26).

31. Diponegoro’s letter to the Dutch, which is now kept in the collection of the Dutch National Archives in The Hague, is stamped with a stamp that reads: “Ingkang Sinuhun Kanjeng Sultan Ngabdul Hamid Ngerucakra Kabir al-Muninin Sayid Panatagama khulifah Rasul Allah S.A.W ing Tanah Jawa” in Arabic letters Pegon Java.

32. The relationship between Kiai Modjo and Diponegoro has broken up (Carey 2011, 741).

33. Tim G. Babcock (1981a) compiled a list of these names from other sources.

34. Sentot, as the warlord of the paramilitary forces, advised Diponegoro to start the Sabil War (Soekanto 1959, 54).

35. Samudra Pasai (1300-1450); Malaka (1450-1511), Johor (1511-1580); Aceh (1580-1680); Palembang and Banjarmasin (1680-1800); Riau (1800-1900); West Sumatera (1880-1930) (Steenbrink 1984, 55–66).

36. Nahuys (1835a, 196–98, 199–201) mentions that the agreement consists of 9 articles.

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